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PETERSEN V. HUBSCHMAN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY COMES OF AGE
IN ILLINOIS NEW HOUSING
At long last, buyers of new homes in Illinois have reason to
rejoice. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Petersen v. Hubschman
Construction Co.,' has added Illinois to the growing number of
jurisdictions 2 which allow a new home buyer an action against
1. 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
2. The state courts which recognize some type of implied warranty are:
Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971) (implied warranty of
habitability); Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., 535 P.2d 1188 (Alaska
1975) (implied warranty of workmanlike construction); Columbia W. Corp.
v. Vela, 122 Ariz. 28, 592 P.2d 1294 (1979) (workmanlike construction);
Wawak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970) (habitability); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974) (workmanlike construction); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388
P.2d 399 (1964) (habitation and workmanlike construction); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970) (workmanlike construction);
Smith v. Berwin Builders, Inc., 287 A.2d 693 (Del. Super. 1972) (quality
workmanship); Berman v. Watergate W., Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. App. 1978)
(habitability); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972) (fitness and
merchantability); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (fitness for habitation); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972) (fitness
for habitation); Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co., 212 Kan. 65, 510 P.2d 198 (1973)
(fitness for habitation); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969)
(workmanlike construction); Bermes v. Facell, 328 So. 2d 722 (La. 1976)
(merchantability); Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294 (Me. 1979) (habitability); Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 399 A.2d 883 (Md. App. 1979) (habitability); McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974)
(workmanlike construction); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App.
621, 180 N.W.2d 503, affd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970) (fitness for
habitation); Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974) (workmanlike manner); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972)
(merchantable quality and fitness); Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214
N.W.2d 925 (1974) (workmanlike construction); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev.

204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (fitness for habitation); Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H.

435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975) (workmanlike construction); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (fitness for habitation); Clear v. Patterson, 80 N.M. 654, 459 P.2d 358 (Ct. App. 1969) (workmanlike manner); Centreila v. Holland Constr. Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 537, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (workmanlike construction); Hartley v. Bailou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d
776 (1974) (workmanlike construction); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510
(N.D. 1973) (fitness for habitation); Tibbs v. National Homes Constr. Corp.,
52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977) (workmanlike manner); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978) (habitability); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974) (workmanlike
construction and fitness for habitation); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288
A.2d 771 (1972) (habitability); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29,
298 A.2d 529 (1973) (workmanlike construction); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254
S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970) (habitation); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev.,
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the builder-vendor 3 for defective construction based upon a theory of implied warranty of habitability. 4 To achieve this result,
the court has relaxed the rules of caveat emptor5 and merger 6 in
the sale of new homes thereby joining a pervasive and wellnoted trend 7 toward bridging the gap between real property law
and law in the sale of personalty. 8
The relaxation of caveat emptor removes a major impediment to the concept of implied warranty. Caveat emptor is a
maxim which states that the purchaser must examine, judge,
and test for himself. 9 In the past, he bore the entire risk of loss
if he purchased a product and subsequently discovered a deInc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (habitation); Humber v. Morton, 426

S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (suitability for habitation); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128
Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970) (workmanlike construction and suitability for
habitation); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (fitness
for intended use); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975) (habitability); cf. Tibbits v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967) ("as is"
clause prevents an implied warranty).
3. A builder-vendor, as defined in Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288
A.2d 771 (1972), is "[one who buys land and builds homes upon that land
for purposes of sale to the general public." Id. at 123, 288 A.2d at 774. Accord, Humber v. Morton 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
4. The implied warranty had been defined in various ways. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) (fitness for habitation
and workmanlike construction); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d
698 (1966) (fitness for habitation); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky.
App. 1969) (workmanlike manner of construction); House v. Thornton, 76
Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (fitness for intended use); Smith v. Old
Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (merchantable quality and
fitness). For a discussion of implied warranties, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383
(1969 & Supp. 1979).
5. "Let the buyer beware (or take care)." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 281
(4th ed. 1968).
6. When purchaser, pursuant to a contract for sale, takes delivery of
the deed to property, all prior conversations and understandings with reference to that property are merged in the deed. Weber v. Aluminum Ore Co.,
304 Ill. 273, 136 N.E. 685 (1922).
7. See, e.g., Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Bearman); Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchaseof a Defective Home, 49 J. URB. L. 533 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bixby]; Haskell,
The Casefor an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sale of Realty, 53 GEo.L.J.
633 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Haskell]; Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability, 46 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1969), 47 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1970); Roberts,
The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The HousingMerchant Did It, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Roberts]; Roeser, The Implied
Warranty of Habitabilityin the Sale of New Housing: The Trend in Illinois,
1978 S. ILL. U. L.J. 178 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Roeser].
8. See Bixby, supra note 7, at 549. See also Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability- Contractor Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 207 (1979); Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under the Commercial Code
and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 583 (1979).
9. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
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fect. a0 Caveat emptor once governed the sale of both personal
and real property, 1 and was based on the premise that the vendor and purchaser dealt at arm's length. Impliedly, the buyer
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the property. The law
assumed any defects would have been located and corrected on
the buyer's insistence before the transaction was completed.
Recently, the doctrine has been on the decline due to ever-increasing interest in consumer protection. 12 While courts and
legislatures have eroded caveat emptor with respect to personalty, 13 they have only recently directed their attention to its via10. Roeser, supra note 7, at 179. See also Bearman, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541
(1961); Boden, Buyer's Remedies in the Sale of Real Property in California,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1062 (1965); Nielsen, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Real Property-Timefor a Reappraisal,10 ARIz. L. REV. 484 (1968).

11. The classic discussion on caveat emptor is Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
12. See, e.g., Singal, Extending Implied Warranties Beyond Goods:
Equal Protectionfor Consumers of Services, 12 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 859
(1977).
13. Courts have eroded caveat emptor by the imposition of products liability. See James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192 (1955); Prosser,
Fall of the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966). See also Maldonado, Builder Beware: Strict Tort Liabilityfor Mass
ProducedHousing, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 283 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Maldo-

nado].
Legislatures have eroded caveat emptor by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code (1962 Official Text with Comments) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.] warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-314 defines the implied warranty of merchantability:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
The requirement that the seller be a merchant limits the scope of liability
under the implied warranty. U.C.C. § 2-104 defines "merchant":
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-315 defines fitness for purpose as:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The U.C.C. has been adopted by every state except Louisiana. Louisiana,
however, has enacted statutes which impose warranties on both personal
and real property transactions. See LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. arts. 2520, 2521, 2541,

2544 (West 1952).
Several other legislatures have enacted warranty statutes for real estate transactions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-116 et seq. (West 1978);
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bility in real estate transactions. The courts that have taken an
"enlightened approach"' 4 and relaxed or completely discarded
caveat emptor, have done so because they have felt it has become an outmoded theory whose application in today's society
15
is unjust.
Today, new housing is largely mass-produced 1 6 and closely
akin to a consumer product. 1 7 Therefore, like the purchaser of
goods, the new home buyer is forced to rely heavily on the skill
and integrity of the builder-vendor. This reliance is given great
weight by courts which grant the new home purchaser an action
against the builder-vendor for defective housing. 18
§ 10-203 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 327A
(West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.46:3B-1 et seq. (West 1979).
14. In 7 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926A (3d ed. Jaeger 1963), Professor
Jaeger noted that although caveat emptor was still broadly applied in the
realty field, some courts have been inclined to make an exception in the
sale of new housing where the vendor is also the developer or contractor.
"In such a situation, a purchaser relies on the implied representation that
the contractor possesses a reasonable amount of skill necessary for the
erection of a house; and that the house will be fit for human dwelling." In
conclusion he noted that "it would be much better if this enlightened approachwere generally adopted with respect to the sale of new houses for it
would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerrybuilding that
has become perceptible over years." Id. (emphasis added).
15. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), where it is stated,
"The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern home buying practices. It does a disservice ... to the ordinary prudent purchaser [and] to the industry itself by
lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, . . . and purveyor[s] of
shoddy work." Id. at 562. See also Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415
P.2d 698 (1966). Here the court recognized that:
The old rule . . . does not satisfy the demands of justice .... The
purchase of a home is not an everyday transaction for the average famfly, and in many instances is the most important transaction of a lifetime. To apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer,
and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business of building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial of justice.
Id. at 71, 415 P.2d at 710 (emphasis added).
16. American business has attempted to meet the growing demand for
low cost housing by coupling assembly line techniques with higher volume
sales. Maldonado, supra note 12, at 283. See also Roberts, supra note 7, at
846.
17. "[T]here is no substantial difference between the sale of a house
and the sale of [a] good .... Therefore [this] implied warranty of fitness
for use attendent upon the sale of personal property should attach to [the]
sale of a house." Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 637, 640, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022
(1974). "Although considered to be a real estate transaction ... . the
purchase of a residence is in most cases the purchase of a manufactured
product, the house. The land involved is seldom the prime element in such
a purchase." Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1972).
See also Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 62, 154 N.W.2d 803,
807 (1967). But cf.Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 50 Ill.
App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d
923 (1977) (building is not a product for strict liability purposes).
18. See, e.g., Conyers v. Molloy, 7 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988
(1977); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91-92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
MD. (REAL PROPERTY) CODE ANN.
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Merger also acted with undue severity against the home
purchaser. All agreements between the seller and the purchaser were merged into the deed upon its delivery. Thus, the
acceptance of the deed foreclosed the buyer from any cause of
action for defects subsequently found, except to the extent that
he had expressly reserved his right against the vendor in the
deed. 19 Although certain exceptions to the merger doctrine
were created, 20 the usual result was that the purchaser of a new
home had less protection than the purchaser of any other new
21
product.
Courts, faced with the harsh results of caveat emptor and
merger, sought to alleviate these inequities by introducing the
22
concept of implied warranties with respect to the sale of realty.

Under this warranty theory, the builder-vendor impliedly warrants that when the purchaser takes possession of the house, its
fixtures are free from structural defects and its construction
was performed in a workmanlike manner.23 This implied warMany commentators also have urged the reliance concept be given great
weight. See Bearman, supra note 7, where the author states:
The vendee's strongest argument is reliance. He is admittedly un-

skilled in the mysteries of house construction and must therefore rely
heavily upon the superior skill and training of his builder-vendor. Inspection will be of little use, as has been argued previously, in protecting the vendor both because of the expense and because the defects are
usually hidden. Though the vendor-vendee relationship may not be
technically a fiduciary one, the trust placed in the vendor coupled with

the relative helplessness of the vendee, make it one, contends the vendee, on which the law should impose that high standard.
Id. at 574.
19. See Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963),
affd, 31 Ill. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964). See also Schwartz, Defective Housing: The Fall of Caveat Emptor, 33 Am. TmiAL LAW A.J. 122 (1970).
20. a) Express warranties do not merge into the deed. See Mercer v.
Meinel, 29011. 395, 125 N.E.2d 288 (1919); Rouse v. Brooks, 66 I. App. 3d 107,
383 N.E.2d 666 (1978).
b) Quality warranties are independent to conveyance of the title.
Therefore, they are not satisfied by acceptance of the deed. Rouse v.
Brooks, 66 Ill. App. 3d 107, 383 N.E.2d 666 (1978). See also Dunham, Vendor's
Obligation as to Fitness of Landfor a ParticularPurpose, 37 MiNN. L. REV.
108, 125 (1953).
c) An executory agreement for the performance of separate and distinct provisions does not merge with the deed. See Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Wabash-Randolph Corp., 384 Ill. 78, 51 N.E.2d 132 (1943); Trapp v.
Gordon, 366 Mll. 102, 7 N.E.2d 869 (1937).
d) The prior contract is superseded only to such of its provisions as
are covered by conveyance made pursuant to its terms. Brownell v. Quinn,
App. 2d 206, 197 N.E.2d 721 (1964).
47 Ill.
21. See note 12 supra.
22. The terms "implied warranty of habitability," "implied warranty of
fitness," and "implied warranty of suitability" have been used synonymously by courts. See, e.g., Klos v. Gochel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 570, 554 P.2d
1349, 1351-52 (1976).
23. See Roeser, supra note 7, at 182-83.
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ranty arises as a matter of public policy and protects the purchaser from losses due to latent defects which would not have
24
occurred in a reasonably constructed home.
The first indication that courts would deviate from caveat
emptor occurred in 1931.25 In Miller v. Cannon Hills Estates
Ltd.,26 the court held that an implied warranty for workmanlike
construction existed in the sale of an uncompleted home, primarily because the purchaser was forced to rely on the builder's
skill to complete the home in a workmanlike fashion.2 7 While
28
this decision was followed in several American jursidictions, it

was also criticized for distinguishing between a complete and an
incomplete home. 29 The major breakthrough came in 1964 when
the Colorado Supreme Court, in Carpenterv. Donohoe,30 held
24. Id. at 183. The implied warranties arose through imposition by the

courts, rather than through the terms of the sales contract. The underlying
purpose was to protect the purchaser of defective goods by a principle of
fairness. Warranty law from its inception has been an uneasy merger of
contract and tort law, sometimes "relying on the presumed intent of the
parties, at other times invoking morality or public policy." Comment, The
Consumer Warranty Law in CaliforniaUnder the CommercialCode and the
Song-Beverly and Magnuson Mass Warranty Acts, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583,

589 (1979). The implied warranty of habitability, however, should be viewed

as essentially contractual in nature. This would recognize the fact that the
parties are actually bargaining for the sale of a habitable dwelling, i.e.,
when the seller fails to deliver a habitable dwelling, he has not fulfilled his
side of the contract. Comment, The Implied Warrantyof Habitability- Contract or Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 207, 210 (1979).
25. For discussions regarding the rise of the implied warranties, see
Jaeger, Apartments and Houses: The Warranty of Habitability,12 AKRON L.
REV. 373 (1979); McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New House Construction Revisited, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 136 (1974); Roeser, The Implied Warranty of
Habitabilityin the Sale of New Housing: The Trend in Illinois, 1978 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 178 (1978); Comment, Washington'sNew Home Implied Warranty of
Habitability- Explanationand Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REV. 185 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Washington]; Note, Implied Warrantiesin New Home
Construction: Caveat Ohio Purchaser,46 U. CIN. L. REv. 207 (1977); Note,
Implied Warranty v. Caveat Emptor, 13 RICH. L. REv. 381 (1979). See generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
26. [19311 2 K.B. 113. The purchaser contracted to buy a home which
was uncompleted at the contract execution. The home contained numerous
structural defects, and the purchaser filed suit. The court allowed recovery,
reasoning that the vendee had no opportunity to inspect for flaws in an uncompleted home. Therefore, they found he had relied entirely on the
builder to complete the job correctly. See Bearman, supra note 7, at 544.
27. [1931] 2 K.B. at 120.
28. See, e.g., Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819
(1957); Hoye v. Century Builders, 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
29. See Roeser, supra note 7, at 180 n.7.
30. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). The home was completed when
purchased. Later, the foundation had to be shored to prevent further shifting which had cracked the walls. The court stated:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is
near completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house
seems incongruous. To say that the former may rely on an implied war-
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that the implied warranty extended to either an unfinished or a
completed home. Since that time, only a dwindling minority of
states have refused to recognize an implied warranty in realty
actions. 31 The remainder have recognized that the buyers of
goods in an industrialized society must rely on the skill and honesty of the builder-vendor to assure that homes are of adequate
quality.32 Accordingly, courts have allowed recovery on a theory
of implied warranty for such defects as an improperly functioning heating or air conditioning system; 33 cracked walls; 34 a leaky

basement; 35 faulty roofing; 36 a defective septic system; 37 a defective chimney which caused fire damage; 38 a defective foundation
and wall supports; 39 an inadequate well; 40 and even the unsuita41
ble nature of the site selected for the home.
Although construction methods are generally no different in
Illinois than in other states, Illinois has faced a distinct problem
in that its system of courts has vacilated on whether or not the
implied warranty of habitability existed. 42 Because the Illinois
ranty and the latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.
Id. at 81, 388 P.2d at 402.
31. Little v. Merck, 124 Ga. App. 73, 183 S.E.2d 234 (1971); Bruce Farms,
Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978); Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d
155, 168 N.W.2d 190 (1969).
32. See Bixby, supra note 7, at 549.
33. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972); Bermes v. Facell, 328 So. 2d 722 (La. 1976).
34. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Oliver v. City
Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d
428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
35. Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969); Henggeler v.
Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209
S.E.2d 776 (1974).
36. Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503
(1970), aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970).
37. Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972); Yepsen v. Burgess,
269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175
S.E.2d 792 (1970); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
38. Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. 1968).
39. Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970).
40. Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 399 A.2d 883 (Md. App. 1979);
Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
41. See Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Waggoner
v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
42. a) The districts which recognized an implied warranty of habitability were: 1st Dist.: Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184
N.E.2d 728 (1962). The purchaser was allowed to recover from the buildervendor for latent defects in the construction of the new home, including
cracked plaster in the bedroom and water leakage in the roof, basement,
and bathroom. The court relied heavily on Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates,
Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113, to defeat the doctrine of merger and allow the plain-
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Supreme Court had failed earlier to decide this issue 43 and due
to the continuing conflict among the appellate districts, the time
for resolution was ripe when the supreme court was recently
presented with the question of whether an implied warranty of
habitability exists in the sale of new homes.
FACTS AND DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS

In April, 1972, Raymond and Dolores Petersen entered into a
tiff-purchaser recovery. See also Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 Ill.

App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1977). Plaintiff brought suit to recover for damages due to a defective roof and foundation. The appellate court reversed
the judgment for the plaintiff because the complaint had failed to allege the
house was unfit for human habitation alleging, instead, a breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The court remanded the case
and stated what it felt to be the nature of the warranty of habitability. "[I]f
a new home is not structurally sound because of a substantial defect of construction, such a home is not habitable." Id. at 106, 365 N.E.2d at 511.
3d Dist.: Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972). The
plaintiff-purchaser sought damages from the builder-vendor for water damage caused by defendant's poor installation of drain tile. The house was
complete when purchased. The court rejected caveat emptor based on the
reliance concept and found that an implied warranty of habitability exists
which allows an action against the builder-vendor. See also Garcia v. Hynes
& Howe Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 64 (1975). Here the
court sought to resolve the dichotomy caused by their decisions in Hanavan and Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963), affid,
31 Ill. 2d 1894, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964). The appellate court followed Hanavan
and made a confusing attempt to discount Coutrakon as non-controlling
due to the court's changed geographical location.
4th Dist.: Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977).
Plaintiffs purchased a home from defendant-builder. They alleged that due
to a lack of ventilation in the attic the house was not habitable because of
water damage. The court, citing various law reviews and sister state precedents, held that the implied warranty for habitability exists in Illinois. They
also noted that because the standard disclaimer clause in the sales contract
was insufficient to adequately appraise the purchasers of their waiver, the
disclaimer was invalid.
b) The districts which refused to recognize an implied warranty of habitability were:
3d Dist.: Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963),
af'd, 31 Ill. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964). Plaintiffs purchased a new home
from defendant-builder. The home, although uncompleted at the purchase
date, was subsequently completed. Five months after the heating unit was
first turned on, it caused two fires and extensive damage. The appellate
court reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff based upon the
doctrines of merger and the complete/incomplete dichotomy. This decision
followed the dissent in the earlier Weck case.
5th Dist.: Narup v. Higgins, 51 Ill. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (1964) (abstract opinion). The court refused to find on implied warranty of condition
or quality in the sale of a new home even though the plaintiffs had to repair
a defective roof, curbing, and a defective air conditioner.
43. The court in Coutrakon v. Adams, 31 Ill. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964),
affg 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963), never addressed the issue of
an implied warranty, deciding the case on evidentiary grounds. They noted,
however, that the warranty issue presented an "interesting problem." 31 InI.
2d at 190, 201 N.E.2d at 101.
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contract with Hubschman Construction Co. for the purchase of
land and the construction of a new home. The parties agreed to
an offset from the contract price for work which Petersen himself would perform. 44 Later, the Petersens paid $10,000 in earnest money.45 In November and December of 1972, Mr. Petersen
complained about and requested repair of various defects in the
house. Subsequent repairs were not done to his satisfaction.
The Petersens refused to close the deal unless Hubschman either placed $1,000 in a joint escrow account to insure correction
of the defects or satisfactorily repaired the defects. Hubschman
refused to establish the escrow account 46 and said he would repair the defects, but demanded that the Petersens first close the
deal. They refused. Hubschman then attempted to invoke the
contract forfeiture clause 47 and upon continued nonpayment by
the Petersens, declared that the earnest money together with all
materials and labor furnished by the Petersens was forfeited.
44. The contract price of $71,400 included various offsets, such as a
plumbing allowance of $2,500 and a painting allowance of $2,000. Raymond
Petersen was a plumbing contractor and was also engaged in the installation of heating, air conditioning, electrical, and ceramic tile units and
fixtures in buildings in Lake and Cook Counties. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 5, Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154
(1979).
45. Generally, earnest money is money deposited to bind a bargain. In
the real estate business, an earnest money deposit is a sum of money very
generally accompanying an offer to purchase the property, indicating the
serious intention of the prospective purchaser. Acceptance of such sum by
the owner could either effect a binding contract of sale and purchase, or it
could effect only an option. Construction of this term would depend upon
the language in the instrument accompanying the deposit. J. CARTWRIGHT,
GLOSSARY OF REAL ESTATE LAW 297 (1972).
46. One of defendant's arguments, both at trial and on appeal, was that
the Petersens, by demanding that $1,000 be held back to insure completion,
were attempting to impose a unilateral amendment to an existing bilateral
contract. See 53 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 368 N.E.2d at 1048. This could also be
viewed, however, as a valid attempt to modify the contract, which if accepted, would have led to the closing of the deal.
As the appellate court observed, "from the practical standpoint, arrangements for an escrow hold back are frequently in the best interest of
both parties," and since the defendants had not substantially performed,
they had no right to demand the full purchase price. Id.
47. Paragraph 12 of the contract provided, inter alia:
FORFEITURE: If the Purchaser fails to make any of the cash payments
hereinabove set forth or perform any of the covenants required of Purchaser hereunder, this Agreement shall, at the option of Contractor and
upon ten (10) days' notice to Purchaser by certified mail, be forfeited
and determined and Purchaser shall forfeit all payments made under
this Agreement and such payments shall be retained by said Contractor in full satisfaction and as liquidated damages sustained by Contractor.
Record at 15, Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 626, 368
N.E.2d 1044 (1977).
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The Petersens filed suit48 demanding return of their earnest
money and the value of labor and materials they had furnished.
The trial court found substantial defects in the construction;
namely, improperly installed siding; a defective bay window; deterioration in the drywalls; a defective front door; and the basement floor pitched in the wrong direction.4 9 Therefore, the court
ruled that Hubschman had not substantially performed the contract and the termination resulted in a breach. This entitled the
Petersens to recover both their earnest money and the value of
labor and materials they had furnished. Accordingly, judgment
50
was entered for the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the defendants argued that since the home was
constructed in a manner sufficient to provide a safe place to live
and shelter its inhabitants from the elements, the contract for
the construction of a house was substantially performed. The
court, however, rejected this contention and affirmed the judgment below.5 1 The Illinois Supreme Court granted Hubschman's petition for leave to appeal.
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT OPINION

In affirming the judgments of the lower courts, the supreme
48. In the circuit court of Lake County, Illinois.

49. The exact nature of the defects were:
1. The drywall in a substantial portion of the residence had deteriorated and the nails had "popped" as a result of failure to install insulation and this defect had not been satisfactorily remedied and still
existed in December of 1972 and the drywall tape seams were visible
through the paint. It is the finding of this court that such defects are not

of the type ordinarily found in the installation of drywall.
2. The front door was defective in that it was too large for its jamb and
would not close properly.
3. The bay window had been improperly installed and was warped and
discolored.
4. The basement floor was pitched in the wrong direction with the result that seepage water in the basement drained toward the washroom.
5. A portion of the exterior siding was not properly installed and defect therein had not been properly remedied.
Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., No. 73-CH 103, slip op. at 3 (19th Cir.,
filed Oct. 14, 1975). It would seem plaintiff's request for a $1,000 escrow ac-

count indicated that repairs would cost no more than that amount. Therefore, the "defects in substance" constituted a mere 1.4% of the purchase
price of $71,400.
50. The judgment totalled $19,668.58 ($10,500 for money paid under the
contract and $9,168.58 for labor and materials furnished). The court also
noted that defendant had sold the house to a third party for $78,000.
51. 53 Ill. App. 3d 626, 368 N.E.2d 1044 (1977). Defendant's argument was
based on Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 IlM.App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d
509 (1977). The court found Goggin clearly distinguishable, however, since
it turned upon the implied warranty of habitability, and not upon the question of whether the builder had substantially performed his contract. 53 Inl.
App. 3d at 631, 368 N.E.2d at 1048.
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court held that there is an implied warranty of habitability included in the sale of a new home by a builder-vendor. This implication will support a vendee's action against the buildervendor for latent defects and will avoid the unjust results of caveat emptor and merger.5 2 The court determined that the warranty of habitability means that a home must be reasonably fit
for its intended use,5 3 and any disclaimer of this warranty must
54
be strictly construed against the builder-vendor.
The court based its holding on four conclusions: (1) due to
the vast changes that have taken place in the method of constructing and marketing new homes, 55 the unjust results of caveat emptor and merger should be alleviated;5 6 (2) the
purchaser has a justifiable expectation in receiving a house that
is reasonably fit for use as a residence;5 7 (3) the implied warranty arises with the execution of the contract 58 and the buildervendor's substantial performance of it is a constructive condition precedent to performance by the vendee;5 9 and (4) the evidence indicated the builder had failed to substantially perform
the contract. 60 The court's rational basis and logical defense for
arriving at these conclusions was based primarily on public policy considerations and an analogy to the Uniform Commercial
61
Code.
The court recognized a need to protect new home purchasers from the outmoded concepts of caveat emptor and merger in
much the same way that they had protected tenants in apartment leases, by the adoption of an implied warranty of habitability.62 They defined this warranty to be reasonable fitness for
52. 76 IlM. 2d at 39, 389 N.E.2d at 1157.
53. Id. at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.

54. Id. at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
55. While the court never mentioned the specific changes, some could
include the mass produced nature of modern housing, the expanding use of
models and samples to sell new homes, and due to the sheer volume of construction, a lessening of quality.
56. Id. at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
59. Id. at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
60. Id. at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
61. Official Text and 1972 Comments. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-101
et seq. (1977).

62. In Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972), the
court essentially viewed a landlord-tenant relationship as a contractual relationship, with corresponding obligations on both parties, the landlord's
being to substantially comply with health and safety provisions. Id. at 366,

280 N.E.2d at 217. This established an implied warranty of habitability in all

residential leases. See Fusco, Collins, & Birnbaum, Damagesfor Breach of
the Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin 'Illinois-A RealisticApproach, 55
Cm.-KENTr L. REv. 337 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fusco].
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intended use because the U.C.C. lays down similar warranties
for the purchaser's protection in the sale of goods; 63 the buildervendor knows that the purchaser has bargained for a home,64
and the purchaser has not received what he has bargained for
merely because the house is capable of being inhabited. 65 The
effect of comparing the implied warranty in the sale of new
homes to the implied warranties under the U.C.C. is to establish
requirements that the house would be of fair average quality,
that it would pass without objection in the building trade, and
that it would be fit for the ordinary purpose of living in it.66
The combination of public policy considerations and an
analogy to the U.C.C. is also apparent in the court's discussion of
a possible disclaimer of the implied warranty. 67 While a knowing disclaimer of the implied warranty is not violative of public
policy, it will be strictly construed against the builder-vendor. 68
The last area the court discussed was contract law. The
court held that substantial performance of the contract within
the standards set by the implied warranty of habitability is a
constructive condition precedent to the purchaser's duty to pay.
Since the trial court found through evaluation of the evidence
that Hubschman had not substantially performed the contract,
the implied warranty was not fulfilled by Hubschman at the
69
time of his repudiation. This entitled Petersen to recover.
ANALYSIS

The adoption of an implied warranty of habitability in the
sale of new homes is long overdue. The incongruity of protecting the purchaser of a defective $0.79 dog leash while ignoring
the purchaser of a $70,000 new home has no place in a modern
consumer society.70 It was anomalous that one of the largest
single investments in a consumer's life offered the least consumer protection. 71 But, while the underlying conceptualization
by the court is sound, certain aspects of the Petersen decision
may create problems.
63. "(W]e hold ... that the house ... when conveyed to the vendees,
2d at 42, 389 N.E.2d
would be reasonably suited for its intended use." 76 Ill.
at 1159.
64. Id. at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
65. Id. at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
66. See U.C.C. § 2-314. See also Washington, supra note 25, at 211-12.
67. The U.C.C. section on disclaimer is § 2-316.
68. 76 1ll.
2d at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
69. Id. at 43-44, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
70. See Haskell, supra note 7, at 633.
71. See Bixby, supra note 7, at 536.
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Latent Defects
One of the troublesome aspects of the opinion is its reference to "latent defects." By most definitions, the defects the
Petersens requested repaired were not latent, but rather patent..72 There are several possible explanations for the court's decision, the apparent one being that since the trial court had
already found that the house was substantially defective, the
supreme court merely took the opportunity to enunicate a general policy to apply to future cases.
The second possibility is far more commendable. The court
may have felt that what constituted patent defects to an experienced contractor would be latent defects to the ordinary, inexperienced purchaser. This common sense approach suggests
that one who is intimate with home construction methods can
spot defects which are obvious to him and which warn him of
hidden problems, but which would be missed by an ordinary
purchaser. In Petersen, for example, the existence of "nail popping" indicated to Petersen that insulation was lacking in the
walls. Because Petersen was an experienced builder, he noticed
73
this problem and attempted to have it corrected.
The court also failed to define what constitutes a defect. A
product is defective if it is not fit for the ordinary purpose for
which such a product is used. 74 The court seemingly applied
this definition by stating that since Hubschman had not substantially performed the contract, the house was defective, and
the implied warranty of fitness for intended use was not satisfied.75 This does not mean that any flaw a purchaser discovers
will render the house defective. The builder cannot be expected
to bear the burden of constructing a perfect structure because
such flawless construction is impossible. Many courts have
adopted a reasonableness standard to determine if something is
defective. 76 Under this standard, a defect is determined by judg72. A latent defect is one which a reasonably careful inspection will not
reveal; one which could not have been discovered by inspection. McGourty
v. Chiapetti, 38 111. App. 2d 165, 186 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1962). Accord, BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONRY 1026 (4th ed. 1968). But see Note, 447 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 175

(1972) (what is latent will often depend on circumstances of case).
73. Record at 56, 94, Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., No. 73-CH 103

(19th Cir., ified Oct. 14, 1975). This is not to suggest that "nail popping" is

caused solely by a lack of insulation or that it is even a defect. The example
merely illustrates that someone in the business has a greater awareness of
potential defects.
74. BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 377 (5th ed. 1979).

75. 76 Ill.
2d at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
76. See, e.g., Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (Ct.
App. 1979); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d (Mo. 1972); Klug &
Smith Co. v. Sommer, 265 N.W.2d 269 (Wis. 1978).
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ing the problem as a matter of reasonableness, and not of
perfection. It is a question of fact. This inquiry into reasonableness operates in much the same fashion as the investigation of
substantial performance. Either case would allow the courts to
be flexible depending upon the nature of the defect or the injury
77
to the parties.
The use of the term latent defect and its application also
suggests the problem of the appropriateness of the remedy. In
Petersen, the court properly allowed Petersen to recover both
his earnest money and the value of his labor and materials.
Hubschman had not substantially performed the contract when
he attempted to declare a forfeiture, and the proper remedy at
that point was rescission. 78 However, the court, by allowing this
rescission and then declining to decide whether it would be applicable if the defects had not been discovered until after the
deed had been delivered, 79 acts inconsistently and denies relief
for the majority of new home purchasers. The court on the one
hand allows a cause of action against the builder-vendor for latent defects which interfere with the vendee's legitimate expectations 8° and then refuses to say what recovery may be had. A
narrow interpretation of this holding will do nothing for new
home purchasers, it will only protect them if they can find defects before closing. Prior to this decision, caveat emptor and
merger combined to deny the new home purchaser an action for
latent defects even if they were extensive. The implied warranty arose to rectify that situation. To limit the Petersen holding merely to defects discovered prior to closing would be to
ignore the entire purpose of an implied warranty. The purchaser should be allowed to recover at least damages for subsequent discovery of latent defects, 8 1 the proper measure of
77. The test of substantial performance is not strict compliance with the

plans and specifications of the contract, but "whether the builder'sperformance meets the essential purpose of the contract." Klug

&Smith Co. v. Som-

mer, 265 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Wis. 1978) (emphasis added). Using this approach
a court would label something a defect only if it renders the house unfit for

habitation.
78. Because the law abhors a forfeiture, the vendor will not be permitted to declare one except where his right to do so is shown clearly and unequivocally. Kingsley v. Roeder, 2 Ill. 2d 131, 117 N.E.2d 82 (1954). Where
the contract contains an implied warranty that the contractor work will be
sufficient for a particular purpose, there is no substantial performance unless the work is sufficient for such purpose. Therefore, one party may rescind the contract because of the substantial nonperformance by the other
party. Eager v. Berke, 11 Ill. 2d 50, 54, 142 N.E.2d 36, 39 (1957); Lowrie v. City
of Evanston, 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923 (1977). See 12 WULISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1455 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
79. 76 Ill. 2d at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
80. Id. at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.

81. Obviously the purchaser should not be forced to take a substantially
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82
damages being the cost to repair the defective condition. Rescission should not be allowed unless the defects83 are not susceptible to rectification by some suitable remedy.
This does not mean that any defect a purchaser discovers
prior to closing will allow the purchaser to repudiate the contract. The right to repudiate should be limited to those substantial defects which interfere with the expectation that the house
will be reasonably suited for its intended use.8 4 The trial courts
should be allowed to exercise broad discretion when deciding
the question of substantial defects in newly constructed homes.
This will enable them to further justice in the best interest of
the parties to the contract for the sale of a home.

defective home. However, all the cases which applied the implied warranty
of habitability, see note 2 supra, dealt with defects which were discovered
after closing. The overwhelming majority of courts in those cases applied
damages as the proper remedy. While none of these cases spoke in terms of
"substantial defects," they provided for damages in cases of severe defects.
See text accompanying notes 30-38 supra.
82. See Mason v. Griffith, 281 Ill. 246, 256, 118 N.E. 18, 21 (1917); Watson
Lumber Co. v. Mouser, 30 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110, 333 N.E.2d 19, 28 (1975); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 281 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1972). Generally, as in
most warranty cases, the measure of damages for defects which can be rem-

edied is the reasonable cost of remedying the defect. Roeser, supra note 7,

at 186; accord,Ramunno, Implied Warranty of Fitnessfor Habitationin Sale
of Residential Dwellings,43 DEN. L. REV. 379, 386 (1966) (if property is capa-

ble of repair, measure of damages should be cost of repairs). This standard

is also consistent with the purpose of damages, that is to put the aggrieved
party into the position that he would have been had the contract been performed. See, e.g., Kemp v. Gannett, 50 Ill. App. 3d 429, 365 N.E.2d 1112
(1977). The importance of the court's enunciation (or lack of it) on the
question of damages cannot be overemphasized. One reason Jack Spring
has not greatly benefited tenants is that the court failed to set guidelines as
to the measure of damages. See Fusco, supra note 58, at 338.
83. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711
(1966) (defects susceptible of remedy ordinarily would not warrant rescission; if the defects are not readily remediable, buyer is entitled to rescission
and restitution). This would be in keeping with the court's statement that
it would be manifestly unjust to force the Petersens to accept a house in
which there were defects in substance and to settle for damages. 76 Ill. 2d
at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160. But this rule should only apply if the defects are
substantial and render the house unfit for its intended purpose.
84. By their very nature, substantial defects are not readily remediable
and probably would not satisfy the condition precedent of fitness for use.
One suggested test for determining if repairs should be allowed in sales of
personal property under the U.C.C. is:
1. Look at the relative importance of the defect to the quality of product as a whole;
2. Look at the complexity of the product in which the defect occurs (if
the product is very complex, it is reasonable that the product would
need some repair); and
3. Look at the aspect of convenience to both parties.
Note, Commercial Law--The Effect of the Seller's Right to Cure on the
Buyer's Remedy of Rescission, 28 ARK. L. REv. 297, 305 (1974).
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ContractLaw
This decision quite possibly signals the end of feudal property law. Just as the Illinois Supreme Court had earlier abandoned property law by viewing a residential landlord-tenant
relationship as basically a contractual one,85 this decision repre-

sents the continuing integration of property law and contract
law via the implied warranty of habitability.
The lower court decisions could have been affirmed using
traditional contract law principles. Indeed, the issue of implied
86
warranty of habitability was never reached in the lower courts.
As the supreme court properly noted, the question of whether
87
there has been substantial performance is a question of fact.

Since the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of nonsubstantial performance, the supreme court could have affirmed
based solely on this ground.8 8 However, the recognition of the
implied warranty of habitability exhibits a desire by the
supreme court to revise real property law to meet the needs of
the complexities of a modern consumer society.8 9 The court
stated that the warranty arose by virtue of the execution of the
agreement between the vendor and vendee. 90 While this is consistent with warranties arising under the U.C.C.,91 it differs with
other jurisdictions where the warranty is said to arisefrom the
purchase of the home, rather than from the sale contract or
deed.92 The Illinois policy thus represents a substantial advance in the emerging real estate and contract law combination.
Because the court labeled the vendor's performance of the
warranty a constructive condition precedent to the purchaser's
duty to pay,93 the contract does not become effective and the
85. See note 62 supra.
86. The trial court decided the case on substantial performance

grounds. The appellate court affirmance even distinguished another case

because it turned upon the implied warranty of habitability, and not upon
substantial performance. 53 IM.App. 3d at 631, 368 N.E.2d at 1048.
87. 76 Ill. 2d at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160. See 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 314,

318 (1960).

88. For additional material on substantial performance, see Joray Mason Contractors, Inc., v. Four J's Constr. Corp., 61 Ill. App. 410, 378 N.E.2d 328
(1978); Watson Lumber Co. v. Mouser, 30 Ill. App. 3d 100, 333 N.E.2d 19

(1975). See generally 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 422 et seq. (1963).
89. Accord, Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability-Contract
or Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 207, 207 (1979).
90. 76 Ill. 2d at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
91. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§§ 9-5 et seq. (1972).

92. See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo.
1972) (emphasis added).
93. 76 Ill. 2d at 43-44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
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parties are not bound until performance of the condition. 94 Accordingly, the courts must specify whether performance is to be
judged by a reasonableness standard, or a substantial performance standard. Because the law imposes the condition for the
purchaser's benefit, this condition may or may not be enforced
at his option.95 This will offer the purchaser the option of: (1)
taking his home and waiving the condition precedent if he feels
the house is satisfactory, or (2) exercising his right and refusing
to close if the vendor refuses to conform to the warranty. The
use of the term "constructive condition" may create problems,
however. If the vendee takes possession and subsequently discovers a latent defect, the builder may argue that the purchaser
waived this condition upon taking possession. This argument,
however, runs contrary to the purpose of the implied warranty
and should not be given effect.
The court's analogy to the U.C.C. raises the question of the
Code's applicability to the sale of real property. The Code itself
explains that it applies only to the sale of goods. 96 However, as
noted earlier, courts are considering homes to be goods with increasing frequency. 97 The Illinois court also seems to have
adopted this reasoning. 98 These developments evidence a clear
trend moving from separate real estate and personalty contract
laws' into a unified law which reasonably protects the con99
sumer.
Reference to the U.C.C. invites consideration of disclaimer
94. See 3A

CORBIN,

Contracts § 662 (1963); 91 C.J.S. Vendor and Pur-

chaser § 110 (1963).
95. O'Brien v. Kawazoye, 27 Ill. App. 3d 810, 816, 327 N.E.2d 236, 241
(1975).
96. U.C.C. § 2-102 states: "[Ulnless the context otherwise requires, this
Article applies to transactions in goods."
97. See note 17 supra. Courts base this on: (a) the fact that consumers
view the purchase of land as incidental to the purchase of a home, Yepsen
v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 640, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974); (b) homes are now
mass-produced and the builder is identical to a merchant, see Bixby, supra
note 7, at 550; (c) the home itself is composed entirely of goods, see Maldonado, supra note 12, at 303; and (d) since the seller knows the buyer is
purchasing a home for habitation, an accompanying warranty for habitation
fulfills the expectations of both parties, see Comment, Extension of Implied
Warrantiesto Developer-Vendorsof Completed New Homes, 11 URB. L. ANN.
257, 257 n.2 (1976), quoted in Note, Implied Warranty v. Caveat Emptor, 13
RICH. L. REV. 381, 386 n.50 (1979).
98. This is especially true since the court mentioned the mass produced
nature of new housing and the fulfilling of the expectations of both parties.
99. One such step is the Uniform Land Transaction Act (1975 Official
Text with 1976 Comments) which recognizes the increasing commercial nature of modern real estate transactions by moving closer to the U.C.C. It
has, like the U.C.C., adopted damages as its primary remedy. See Maggs,
Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Article Two of the Uniform Land
TransactionsAct, 11 GA. L. REv. 275 (1977). See also Kratovil, Mortgage
Law Today, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 251, 267-71 (1980).
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clauses which affect the existence of the implied waiTanty' 0 0
and the Hubschman court felt obliged to discuss disclaimers. It
held that although a knowing disclaimer of the implied warranty
is not against public policy, it will be strictly construed against
the builder-vendor.10 1 Although this policy was already existent
in some jurisdictions, 10 2 the court obviously wanted to insure
that the consumer protections it laid down would not be signed
away in "boilerplate" clauses. 10 3 The court seems to place a
heavier burden on the builder-vendor than is placed on the
merchant under the U.C.C., where, for example, the implied
warranties of fitness may be excluded by general conspicuous
language.' 0 4 Although some jurisdictions do not allow disclaimers of the implied warranty of habitability, 0 5 the Illinois
Supreme Court opinion wisely did not foreclose their use. The
buyer must assume some responsibility and exercise some degree of care, otherwise the builder has too great a burden im100. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-315 (1977).
101. 76 Ill. 2d at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
102. See, e.g., Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977),
where the court held that the clause "[t] here are no warranties ... except
those manufacturers warranties ... [then] in effect" was too broad to have
given adequate notice of waiver. Public policy does not prohibit a disclaimer if it is sufficiently specific. Id. at 21, 364 N.E.2d at 989.
103. The court cited with approval Crowder v. Vandendale, 564 S.W.2d
879 (Mo. 1978), which held that boilerplate clauses, however worded, are
ineffective. The opinion also stated that in order to benefit from a disclaimer, the party must show: (a) a conspicuous provision, (b) that an
agreement in fact had been reached, and (c) the provision must fully disclose the consequences of its inclusion. 76 Ill. 2d at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
104. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability [or fitness], the language must mention
merchantability [or fitness), and ... must be conspicuous. Language
to exclude all implied warrantiles of fitness is sufficient if it states for
example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, .... all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," ".with all faults," or
other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties, and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; and
(b) When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods... there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972)
where the court stated, "[W]e do not believe a reasonable person would
interpret that provision (as is) as an agreement by the purchaser to accept
the house with an unknown structural defect." Id. at 800. But cf. Tibbits v.
Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 422, 425 P.2d 160 (1967) (an "as is" clause prevents an
implied warranty). See also Haskell, supra note 7, at 654 (a merchant
should not be permitted to build and receive money for a structure which
appears to be a house and avoid liability if it is defective).
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posed on him. A sensible approach would be to allow the
builder-vendor to exclude warranties on obvious or patent defects which should be discovered and corrected before closing,
but not to allow the builder-vendor to exclude latent defects
which render the home uninhabitable. 10 6 Therefore, the court in
Petersen through its use of essentially contract principles in a
real estate transaction has continued the integration of contract
and property law and quite possibly signals the end to feudal
10 7
property law.

Limitations on-the Holding

This holding establishing the existence of the implied warranty of habitability represents a significant integration of the
property, contract, and tort laws. Because of this integration,
the case may profoundly alter the role of traditional real estate
law in a modern consumer society. There are, however, several
self-imposed limitations to the Petersen holding.
First, this implied warranty of habitability is limited to the
sale of new homes. 10 8 Other jurisdictions have expanded it to
include "buildings,"'1 9 condominiums, 110 an apartment building, 1 ' and the land itself. 112 While the "new homes" restriction
is probably the first step in a similar expansion, it is logical with
106. Accord, Wawak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1970).
Attorneys are undoubtedly eager to see exactly what the court means by its
discussion of a disclaimer. However, the attorneys should not limit their
consideration strictly to the disclaimer. The court by analogizing to the
U.C.C. opens the door to other alternatives available under the Code, such
as modification of the buyer's remedies (§ 2-719). For an excellent discussion of this area, see J. WmrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 12-1 et seq. (1972).
107. As noted earlier, the implied warranties were originally a combination of tort and contract laws. See text accompanying note 24 supra. The
Petersen decision indicates the Illinois court views the warranty as essentially a contractual concept. This greatly benefits the parties to the transaction by lending predictability and uniformity to this area of the law and by
establishing a framework (under the U.C.C.) which can be applied to the
implied warranty of habitability. See Comment, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability-Contractor Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 207, 216 (1979).
108. While most jurisdictions require the sale of a new home, see, e.g.,

Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 568, 554 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1976), there is no

logical reason the warranty should not extend to the lease of a new home.
App. 3d 361, 397
This recently occurred in Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrels, 78 Ill.

N.E.2d 539 (1979) (the Jack Spring warranty extends to tenancies in singlefamily residences). See also Duke v. Clark, 267 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1978);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
109. Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wash. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976) (applies to
new buildings).

110. Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App. 1972). See also Greenburg v.
Johnston, 367 So. 2d 229 (Fla. App. 1979); Sedmajek v. Weber, 275 N.W.2d 304
(N.D. 1979).
111. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91,
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respect to consumer expectation and with respect to the purpose of the warranty. 113 The purchase of anything larger than a
one or two-family home involves substantial sums of money.
Someone in that position can afford competent building inspectors and should obtain legal advise prior to contracting. The
purpose of the implied warranty is to protect the ordinary, relatively ignorant home buyer in his purchase of an expensive necessity, namely a house suitable for habitation. The court
apparently followed this reasoning by limiting the implied warranty to new homes.
Another limitation placed on the holding is that it applies
only to "builder-vendors." While this term has not been defined
in Illinois, it has been applied as one who both builds and sells a
house which he owns, 1 4 and the Petersen court apparently
adopted this usage. This preferred approach leaves the burden
on the one who is in the business, responsible for the defect, in a
position to repair the defect, and better able to spread the cost
over several transactions. 11 5 The court wisely limited the liability to one who is in the business of building and selling homes
16
and therefore merits the purchaser's reliance.
115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974) (warranty covers "new construction" and was
applied to an apartment building).
112. See Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) (land sold
was restricted to single family dwellings, but drainage conditions made improvement impossible; court allowed rescission on basis of implied warranty); Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Prop., 282 Or. 569, 578, 580 P.2d 173, 177 (1978)
(land developer has duty to determine whether the lots sold are fit for intended use). But see Witty v. Schramm, 62 Ill. App. 3d 185, 379 N.E.2d 333
(1978) (implied warranty of habitability not applicable to a vacant lot).
113. The purpose of the warranty is to protect the unknowledgeable purchaser of a new home who is forced to rely on a builder's skill. To expand
the warranty to include all structures is contrary to the original purpose of
the warranty. As Professor Bearman stated:

Since the imposition of the unqualified implied warranty of quality is
based upon the theory that it is the ordinary home buyer, relatively ignorant of the business of buying a home, who needs this statutory protection, the unqualified warranty is implied . . . only in purchases of
one- or two-family homes. Anything larger than a two-family dwelling
is often an apartment house, and these are commonly purchased by
corporations or individuals with enough wealth to afford competent inspection or knowledge of the realty business to lower the important reliance factor considerably.
Bearman, supra note 7, at 575.
114. See, e.g., Elmore v. Blume, 31 Ill. App. 3d 643, 645, 334 N.E.2d 431, 432
(1975).
115. See, e.g., Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988
(1977).
116. Just as the U.C.C. limits the implied warranties to merchants, see
note 12 supra, so should this warranty be limited to one who holds himself
out as having the skill necessary for the particular job. Some courts have
extended the term "builder-vendor" to include not only developers, but
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A third limitation is the standard established to define habitability. "Reasonable fitness for habitation" does not mean that
the completed home must be entirely free of defects. As many
courts have noted, no home is built without defects." 7 The purpose of the warranty is to allow the purchaser to move into a
home which meets his reasonable expectation and to allow him
future protection from latent defects that render the house uninhabitable. 118 The imposition of fitness for intended purpose
holds the builder-vendor liable for defects in construction which
119
a reasonable builder would not have made.
THE IMPACT OF PETERSEN

As a result of Petersen, the implied warranty of habitability
only applies in the sale of a new home by a builder-vendor. If
other jursidictions are any indication, the scope should eventually be expanded to include all "new buildings.' 120 However,
this will still exclude the vast number of older homes sold. The
same expectations and reliance are present in the purchase of a
one-year old home for $60,000 as are present in the purchase of a
new home for $60,000.121 The fact that neither U.C.C. section 2314 (implied warranty, merchantability) nor U.C.C. section 2105(1) (definition of "goods") excludes secondhand goods suggest used homes might be covered if the present trend of analogizing real property and personal property transactions
122
continues.
even first time builders if their primary reason for constructing the house is
resale. Mazurek v. Nielsen, - Colo. App. -, 599 P.2d 269 (1979).
117. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711
(1966); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. 1972); Schipper v. Levitt &Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965); Padula v. J.J. DebCin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 33, 298 A.2d 529, 532 (1973).
118. This is in keeping with the court's language on reasonable expectation and with the underlying policy reasons for adopting the warranty.
119. The implied warranty could also include a requirement of good
workmanlike construction. There existed at common law a duty that one
who contracted to perform construction work impliedly warranted to do the
work in a reasonably workmanlike manner. Dean v. Rutherford, 49 Ill. App.
App. 160, 76 N.E.2d 808
3d 768, 364 N.E.2d 625 (1977); Rehr v. West, 333 Ill.
(1948) (abstract opinion). See 35 I.L.P. Vendor & Purchaser § 242 (West
1958).
120. See notes 109-10 supra.
121. Most sales of real estate involve used construction. If the implied
warranty is recognized only in the area of new construction, then the law
only offers occasional protection to the purchaser. "Any distinction between purchasers of used homes [and purchasers of new homes] with respect to assumption as to quality is wholly unrealistic. The only difference
is degree of expectation." Haskell, supra note 7, at 650-51. See also Bixby,
supra note 7, at 560-63.
122. See also Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under
the Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty
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This also highlights another problem, that of duration of the
warranty. Two schools of thought exist on this subject. One
proposes a statutory limitation. 123 An alternative would rely on
reasonableness. 124 The Illinois Legislature recently adopted a
two-year statute of limitations for all actions arising from the improvement of real estate. The statute runs from the time the
purchaser knew or should have known of the defect, but pre125
cludes any action after twelve years from the date of the act.
This approach represents a viable alternative to the uncertainty
of the reasonableness test and the harshness of the statutory
limitation.
In the foreseeable future, the courts will probably adopt
some form of strict liability in the sale of homes. Indeed, some
commentators and at least one court have discussed such a possibility.126 While we are still years away from such a move, the
transition in the sale of goods from caveat emptor to warranties
to strict liability, can only serve as a model. The Petersen decision has started Illinois down that inexorable path.
One immediate result of the Petersen decision is the abandonment of the doctrines of caveat emptor and merger. While
the court stated that the adoption of an implied warranty merely
relaxes caveat emptor and merger in the instant situation, 27 in
actuality this case was their death knell. This is illustrated by a
recent appellate court application of this "relaxation" of caveat
Acts, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583, 602 (1979). See Barnes v. Mac Brown &Co., 264
Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976) (implied warranty regarding latent defects
runs not only in favor of first purchaser but extends to subsequent purchaser); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979) (second

or subsequent purchaser entitled to implied warranty of habitability); cf.
Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977) (builder
negligent, therefore liable to subsequent purchaser); Casavant v. Compopiano, 114 R.I. 124, 327 A.2d 831 (1974) (purchaser entitled to implied warranty

even though builder had rented out home for one year prior to sale).
123. For example, U.C.C. § 2-725 has a four-year statute of limitations.
Maryland has a one-year statutory limitation on real property transactions.

See MD. [REAL PROPERTY] CODE ANN. § 10-204 (1974).
124. The reasonableness argument is that (1) different parts of the home

have different durational tendencies, and (2) this test would be flexible

enough to fit the needs of the case. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479
S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Padula v. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 33,298 A.2d
529, 532 (1973); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). See also
McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New House ConstructionRevisited, 3
REAL EST. L.J. 136 (1974).

125. Limitation of Action-Real Property Improvements, Pub. Act No. 811169, § 21.3, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3129 (West) (to be codified as ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 83, § 22.3 (1979)).
126. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. 1972), Bixby,
supra note 7, at 533; Maldonado, supra note 12, at 284. But see Lowrie v.
City of Evanston, 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 382, 365 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1977).

127. 76 Ill. 2d at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
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emptor to a used home transaction, 128 and by the supreme
court's own emasculation of the merger doctrine in its opinion. 129 If this does not represent the end to these traditional notions, it at least foreshadows the rapid decline of these two
doctrines in today's society.
CONCLUSION

The supreme court in Petersen clarified the rights of new
home buyers and established consumer protections that will apply to defects in a new home sold by a builder-vendor. The im-

plied warranty of habitability is quite similar to the warranty of
fitness for intended use imposed by the U.C.C. The essence of
the sales contract is the seller's implicit duty to transfer a home
suitable for its intended use, habitation. While the builder-vendor should not be required to build a perfect house, the courts
should use a reasonableness test to determine if the house is fit
for its intended purpose and allow rescission only if there is either non-substantial performance or any latent defect is irreparable. Petersen definitively indicates caveat emptor is an
outmoded concept which no longer accords with modern day
practice. It should be relegated to its rightful place in the pages
of history.
Randall F. Clark

128. In Posner v. Davis, 76 Ill. App. 3d 638, 395 N.E.2d 133 (1979), the court
stated that because of the supreme court's amelioration of the doctrine of
caveat emptor in Petersen, the seller of a used home is under a duty to
disclose facts materially affecting the value of the property to the buyer.
129. The court has effectively prevented merger by the adoption of the
implied warranty of fitness for intended purpose. This warranty includes
both quality provisions, as well as separate implied conditions which will
only merge if substantially performed, see note 20 supra.

